On Oct. 12, The New York Times reported what could potentially be the biggest challenge to U.S. foreign policy makers in this "new war" on terrorism. A week into the air-strikes, the U.S./U.K. bombing campaign of Taliban strongholds and alleged terrorist training camps was showing signs of being mitigated, even neutralized, by the thoroughly complicated political rivalries enmeshed in Afghanistan and beyond. The U.S.-led campaign was being held hostage, it was reported, and the failure of allied planes and missiles to attack front-line Taliban troops was proof of such. Then, in the afternoon of Oct. 20, the first "real" offensive against Taliban front-lines was launched. Why the delay? What quandary made the U.S. military ignore the Taliban troop buildup so far into the campaign?

The problem lay in the breakdown of yet another American dream. This time, the dream involved the Northern Alliance, a loosely formed military coalition of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and others ethnic minorities pitted in defiance against the largely Pushtun Taliban. Until recently, the Alliance was being envisioned as the natural successor of the Taliban by U.S. strategy pundits. Surgically precise and relentless bombing, mixed with some special forces incursions by the U.S. and Britain, followed by the decimation of the Taliban military muscle, followed by a political and military vacuum in the region, followed by the Northern Alliance replacing the Taliban to fill that vacuum. That was the plan emanating from the Pentagon and State Department"s policy-kitchens until a few weeks ago. Simple and straightforward, set forth to deliver the goods, so to say. But now a new geopolitical tryst in the power equation has emerged as a complicating corollary.

A Problem Besides Osama

The U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan is now in a regional cross-fire. On the one hand are the unrelenting complications and enmities within the Afghan political paradigm over the question of who is going to rule Afghanistan once the bombs stop dropping. On the other is a risk of the multi-national coalition being thwarted if extra-Afghan concerns, like those of Pakistan, are not met, all leading to the possible stagnation and eventual inadequacy of the delicately engineered military campaign.

Until Oct. 20, Taliban forces outside Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif were still mounting against the Alliance, which has been hoping to charge through the broken lines of a Taliban army destroyed by U.S. and British bombing. The bombing, however, hadn"t materialized. So far, the U.S. had opted not to attack the Taliban front lines around Kabul so as not to create a vacuum to be filled by the Northern Alliance (the campaign so far had targeted fixed and mobile weapons systems and communication centers in major Taliban-held cities). The reasoning lay in what the Times called a "grim strategic reality": Pakistan, probably the pivotal state in the U.S.-led coalition, has threatened to withdraw from the merger and withdraw permission of airspace, logistical and intelligence support if such a vacuum is created to facilitate a takeover by the Northern Alliance. The Pakistanis clearly don"t want the minority Northern Alliance to enter Kabul, and are in favor of a more broad government in Afghanistan.

The new equation now finds the U.S. bombing campaign to be "regulated" and aimed at more than just destroying the Taliban and the terrorist bases they sponsor, as well as flushing out Osama bin Laden. Creating a broadly-based government in an otherwise anarchic Afghanistan acceptable to other regional players as well as the Afghans themselves is now a further goal which must be met to stabilize the region. The Bush administration thus finds itself in a nation-building campaign, besides a militarized one.

The Pakistan Factor

This is hardly surprising. Pakistan has a natural propensity to desire a friendly government in Afghanistan. Pakistan"s nemesis, a largely Hindu India, lies to the east, while in the west is Shi"ite Iran which has always had plans for regional hegemony. Pakistan is thus anxious about the possible formation of a new government in Kabul dominated by the Northern Alliance, whose constituent Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara elements have received economic and military assistance from both Iran and India and even Russia, a former Cold War foe. The domestic backlash Pakistan is risking now due to its support for the U.S.-led coalition also justifies its concerns for relative stability within Afghanistan, whose 10 million Pushtuns share communal ties with Pakistan"s own 20 million plus Pathans.

A recent Daily column blamed Pakistan for the birth of the Taliban. Denying the U.S. an active role in that equation which is a surprising error, considering that the U.S.