Flashback to Spring 2003: Riding on a Republican sweep during
the 2002 midterm elections, President Bush embarks on his
unilateral war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. With high
approval ratings and broad public support for the war, Bush boasts
of freeing the Iraqi people, and optimistic military commanders
predict that weapons of mass destruction will be found within
weeks. The elite Republican Guard fails to show up for battle.
Democrats, who have yet to find spines, meekly congratulate the
president and applaud the military. “Shock and Awe,”
the new Rumsfeld military doctrine, seems vindicated and the war
appears to be a great success for the Bush administration.

The days of spring 2003 seem far behind us. Saddam has been
found, but his weapons have not. Major combat operations have been
declared over, but fairly significant skirmishes continue to claim
the lives of American soldiers; more than 550 have died.
Controversy rages over the justification for war; Democrats, who
have found spines, are hammering Bush for overstating pre-war
intelligence. In a major step toward Iraqi autonomy, the American
interim authority prepares to transfer power on June 30 to the
25-member Iraqi Governing Council, but much remains to be done.
With mounting casualties, little apparent success and declining
public support, America is in danger of losing resolve.

On this one-year anniversary of the war, our resolve must not
waver. America should be looking to the future, finding ways to
tackle the problems we now face.

Before the administration can make progress, it needs to
apologize — not only to the American people, but also to the
international community. If weapons of mass destruction had been
found in Iraq, or concrete evidence had emerged linking Saddam to
al Qaida, Bush’s pre-war arrogance would have been justified.
Unfortunately, this has not happened. Before the war, Bush blew
away criticism. His deputies marginalized major international
actors such as France and Germany by calling them “old
Europe.” Domestically, his team engaged in character
assassination, insinuating that long-time civil servants were
“unpatriotic” for opposing the war. By apologizing for
this arrogance, Bush can begin healing the rifts he created between
the pro- and anti-war camps.

If Bush apologizes and admits fallibility, he can then return to
the United Nations to elicit its cooperation. Instead of forcing an
American plan upon the Security Council, Bush’s team could
engage in true diplomacy, creating a bilateral solution involving
the United States and the United Nations. While many would argue
that the United States should transfer complete authority, even on
military and security issues, to the United Nations, this move
would seriously endanger the future of Iraq. When bringing the
United Nations on board, leaders could create a unique
power-sharing structure, through which the U.S. military handles
security and wartime operations, while the United Nations can
administrate political duties.

A major concern for the American people is U.S. military
casualties, and the split-control solution would do little to
address this. Handing complete control over to the United Nations
would solve this problem, but would leave military and security
operations in the hands of a far less competent body. As it stands,
the United States is the only nation that has the money and
manpower to engage in such a massive force deployment; more than
100,000 U.S. troops are currently stationed in Iraq. Even if the
United Nations took over security operations, the peacekeepers
would predominantly be American — no other nations can
provide the required number of troops. If American soldiers will
continue to fight in Iraq, it is best to leave them under American
command.

When it comes to the political and reconstruction aspects of
Iraq, however, the United Nations should take over as soon as
possible. When it comes to constructing infrastructure, the United
Nations has a great deal of peacetime experience. In the political
arena, the United Nations has the power to appear neutral. It can
provide a degree of legitimacy that the United States, by virtue of
being a self-interested state, cannot. Furthermore, if the United
States can forget about the political reconstruction of Iraq, it
can focus its money and forces on rooting out the insurgents who
are threatening to topple Iraqi stability.